| 摘要: |
| 尽管以往研究运用制度经济学中的“产权管制结构—体制选择行为—经济制度绩效”范式解释了我国农业经济转轨的本质及其制度绩效提升的机制,但这一范式尚未运用于我国水资源产权制度改革研究。鉴于此,本研究基于对我国水权制度市场化改革现象和政策的梳理,得出以下理论假说:(1)我国水权制度改革的本质是从计划体制向市场体制的转轨,如果从产权管制的角度考虑,其本质是政府对水权管制的放松。(2)政府对水权管制的放松使得水资源经济租值耗散减少、水权市场制度绩效提高。为了进一步论证上述假说,在可交易水权制度和农业剩余水权向工业部门转移的市场交易背景下,定义了水资源经济租值,并通过经济模型推导了水资源经济租值的市场逻辑。在此基础上,分析了不同政府水权管制结构下的水权市场交易主体的行为逻辑及水资源经济租值耗散结果。本研究有助于进一步完善水资源产权制度改革的理论研究,为水资源产权制度改革提供理论依据。 |
| 关键词: 水权制度;农业剩余水权;水资源经济租值;市场主体行为;数理经济模型 |
| DOI： |
| 分类号:S2;S3;5;TV |
| 基金项目:内蒙古自治区高等学校科学研究项目“政府主导水权交易准市场机制:演进机制、经济绩效与政策优化”(NJSY20056)。 |
|
| Market-oriented Reform of Water Rights System and Its Performance Evaluation Based on the Economic Rent Dissipation Theory |
|
zhangchunmei
|
|
College of Economics and Management,Inner Mongolia Agricultural University
|
| Abstract: |
| Although previous research has explained the essence of China"s agricultural economic transition and its institutional performance improvement mechanisms using the "property rights control structure-institutional choice behavior-economic institutional performance" paradigm in institutional economics, this paradigm has not been applied to the study of China"s water resources property rights system reform. Therefore, based on a review of China"s water rights system market-oriented reform phenomena and policies, this study proposes the following theoretical hypothesis: (1) The essence of China"s water rights system reform is the transition from a planned system to a market system, and from the perspective of property rights control, it is the relaxation of government control over water rights; (2) The relaxation of government control over water rights reduces the dissipation of economic rent and improves the institutional performance of the water rights market system. To further demonstrate the above hypothesis, this study defines the economic rent of water resources in the context of the market trade of transferable water rights and the transfer of surplus agricultural water rights to the industrial sector, and deduces the market logic of the economic rent of water resources through an economic model. Based on this, the study analyzes the behavioral logic of market participants in the water rights market under different government water rights control structures and the resulting dissipation of economic rent of water resources. This research contributes to the further improvement of the theoretical research of water resources property rights system reform and provides theoretical basis for the reform of water resources property rights system. |
| Key words: water rights system; agricultural surplus water rights; economic rent of water resources; market subject behavior; mathematical economic model |
