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引用本文:林 澜,赵思远,陈 菁,等.基于第二价格拍卖-eBay改进的取水权 交易价格形成机制初探[J].灌溉排水学报,2025,44(4):129-136.
LIN Lan,ZHAO Siyuan,CHEN Jing,et al.基于第二价格拍卖-eBay改进的取水权 交易价格形成机制初探[J].灌溉排水学报,2025,44(4):129-136.
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基于第二价格拍卖-eBay改进的取水权 交易价格形成机制初探
林 澜,赵思远,陈 菁,代小平
1.河海大学,南京 211100; 2.水利部松辽水利委员会,长春 130012
摘要:
【目的】探究完善取水权交易的定价机制,有效激发市场活力和节水内生动力。【方法】创新提出基于第二价格拍卖-eBay改进的取水权交易价格机制及成交价格的具体算法,并以内蒙古河套灌区为例开展算例模拟,选择3名拍卖主体模拟出价过程,分析各主体的报价策略和要价信息。【结果】由于缺乏市场选择机制,河套灌区一期取水权交易项目在定价机制上,仍存在价格较低、对利益方补偿不足等问题。本文设计的基于第二价格拍卖-eBay改进的取水权交易规则和拍卖机制可以维护出售者利益、激励竞买者真实出价,实现交易双方共赢。【结论】在公共资源配置领域第二价格拍卖-eBay改进的取水权交易定价机制具有适配性,能够为未来全国的取水权交易项目提供算法依据和参考。
关键词:  灌区;取水权;拍卖;水权;水资源
DOI:10.13522/j.cnki.ggps.2024136
分类号:
基金项目:
An improved pricing scheme for water rights trading based on the eBay auction model
LIN Lan, ZHAO Siyuan, CHEN Jing, DAI Xiaoping
1. Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China; 2. Songliao River Water Resources Commission of Ministry of Water Resources, Changchun 130012, China
Abstract:
【Objective】Water rights trading and the associated pricing mechanism are innovative strategies to enhance water use efficiency in regions facing freshwater scarcity. It is crucial to explore an effective pricing mechanism for water rights trading to stimulate market dynamics and foster intrinsic motivations for water conservation. This paper proposes a solution to address this issue.【Method】We proposed an innovative pricing mechanism and a specific algorithm for determining transaction prices, based on a second-price auction, with modifications inspired by eBay’s auction model. A numerical simulation was conducted using the Hetao Irrigation District in Inner Mongolia as a case study. Three auction participants were selected to simulate the bidding process, and their bidding strategies and price-setting behaviors were analyzed.【Result】The Phase I water rights trading project in the Hetao Irrigation District suffers from issues such as low transaction prices and insufficient compensation for stakeholders, due to the lack of a robust market selection mechanism. The auction rules and mechanisms proposed in this study can help protect sellers’ interests, encourage bidders to submit genuine bids, and foster mutually beneficial outcomes for both parties in the transaction.【Conclusion】The improved pricing mechanism for water rights trading, based on a second-price auction model, demonstrates strong adaptability in the context of public resource allocation. It provides a valuable algorithmic framework and serves as a reference for future water rights transaction projects nationwide.
Key words:  irrigation district; water exploiting rights; auction; water rights; water resource